The Problem
Britain's welfare system has over 30 separate benefits, 11 separate assessment processes, and is administered across DWP, HMRC, 300 local authorities, and a separate Scottish agency. Universal Credit was supposed to simplify this. After 13 years and 2.9 billion pounds, it merged six benefits into one but left PIP, Carer's Allowance, Child Benefit, Attendance Allowance, Council Tax Reduction, and the State Pension all outside the system. The DWP's accounts have been qualified by auditors for 37 consecutive years. This is not a system anybody designed. It is what happens when you add a new benefit to solve each new problem without ever removing the old ones.
New Zealand proved in 2013 that consolidation is achievable. They compressed 11 working-age benefits into 3 core payments, administered through a single agency, and reduced future welfare liability by 1.4 billion New Zealand dollars in the first year. We will do the same.
A. Forty Benefits Reduced to Five
The full list of what can currently be claimed runs to approximately 40 distinct working-age and household benefits. Many people do not know they exist. Many overlap. Many create perverse incentives. Most are administered separately with separate forms, separate assessments, and separate fraud vectors. Here is what Forge reduces them to:
| Current benefit category | Number today | Forge equivalent |
|---|---|---|
| Working-age income (UC, JSA, ESA, SSP, maternity etc.) | 9 | Jobseeker Support / Carer and Parent Support |
| Disability and care (PIP, Attendance Allowance, DLA, Carer's Allowance) | 5 | Health and Disability Support (provision, not cash) |
| Housing (Housing Benefit, Council Tax Reduction, Discretionary Housing) | 3 | Within the three-benefit system, paid direct to landlord |
| Children and family (Child Benefit, Tax Credits, SEND vouchers) | 4 | Child Benefit retained, auto-tapered by household income via HMRC. SEND provision paid direct to school. |
| Bereavement (2 payments) | 2 | Absorbed into three-benefit system as time-limited transition |
| Industrial injury (IIDB, REA, Pneumoconiosis schemes) | 3 | Within Health and Disability Support with specialist assessment |
| Winter and seasonal (Winter Fuel, Cold Weather, Warm Home Discount) | 3 | Replaced by structural energy bill reform (Section XI). Decoupling electricity from gas saves £200 to £400 per household permanently. |
| Passported and discretionary (uniform grants, council funds, household support) | ~12 | Single Crisis and Transition Fund. One application. Provision not cash. |
| Total | ~40 | 5 named entitlements |
The five that remain as distinct named entitlements: Jobseeker Support, Carer and Parent Support, Health and Disability Support, Child Benefit (universal, automatically tapered), and the Crisis and Transition Fund. Everything else is either absorbed, replaced by a structural reform, or eliminated because it was a cash payment that should have been direct provision all along.
B. Three Core Working-Age Benefits
Every working-age benefit consolidates into three payments, administered through a single digital system.
| Benefit | Who it covers | Conditions | Time limit |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jobseeker Support | Anyone unemployed and able to work | Register immediately. Apply for jobs weekly. Accept retraining offer at month 3. Refusal tapers benefit. | 2 years. Tapers to subsistence rate after 2 years unless in approved full-time training. |
| Carer and Parent Support | Sole parents with children under 6; full-time carers of disabled family members | Part-time work expected once youngest child turns 6. Carers assessed annually by clinical panel. | Duration of caring responsibility. Transitions to Jobseeker Support when caring ends. |
| Health and Disability Support | People with permanent physical or mental conditions preventing work | Assessed by independent specialist clinical panel. Mandatory care plan for recoverable conditions. No work requirement for permanent severe disability. | No limit for permanent conditions certified by specialist. Reassessed every 3 years for recoverable conditions. |
Child Benefit and the State Pension continue as universal entitlements outside this system. Everything else folds in. Three benefits. One application. One assessment. One agency.
C. What Happens to an Unemployed Person Under Forge: The Danish Model
The Danish model is the clearest answer to how Forge handles unemployment. Denmark pays 90% income replacement to unemployed workers but strictly limits benefits to 2 years and mandates active retraining from day one. The result: 2.6% unemployment, the second lowest in the OECD, and half of all benefit spells resolved within 3 months. The UK pays far less but allows indefinite claims with no meaningful retraining requirement. The result is 1.4 million people who have been on out-of-work benefits for more than a year. Forge adopts the Danish principle: generous short-term support, active support to find work, hard limit on passive claiming.
Week by week: what Jobseeker Support looks like
- Day one: register with the new single DWP service. A work coach is assigned. A skills assessment takes place in the first two weeks to identify existing qualifications, experience, and what jobs are realistic at what wage level. The claimant is not told to search for jobs in a vacuum. They are told what jobs are available in their area and what skills they need to get them.
- Months 1 to 3: higher initial payment rate to prevent the immediate poverty spiral. Job searching with active support from a work coach who knows the local labour market. Two weekly contact points, one in person and one by phone or digital. Fast referral to the Citizens Advice debt service if financial crisis is developing.
- Month 3: mandatory retraining offer. If still unemployed at month 3, a funded skills programme is offered. The claimant chooses from an approved menu based on their skills assessment and local employer demand: digital skills, trade apprenticeships, healthcare and social care, logistics and supply chain, construction, green energy installation. The training is paid, structured, and leads to a recognised qualification within 6 months. Refusal to accept any training offer without good reason tapers benefit by 25%.
- Month 6: formal review. Progress assessed. If in training: full support continues. If not in training and not in work: intensive work programme begins, 35 hours per week of structured job search, work experience placements, and skills sessions. This is the equivalent of a working week spent actively moving toward employment.
- Month 12: second formal review. If still unemployed: community contribution scheme activates. The claimant works 3 days per week on community projects (road maintenance, social care support, environmental projects, council services) and spends 2 days on intensive job search. They are paid Jobseeker Support plus a community contribution top-up. They are contributing, building recent work history, and not sitting idle.
- Year 2 limit: after 2 years, benefit reduces to subsistence level unless the claimant is in approved full-time accredited training. This is the hard limit that makes the generosity of the earlier stages credible. Denmark spends 1.2 to 2% of GDP on active labour market programmes. The UK spends 0.3%. Forge increases this to at least 1%, funded from welfare simplification savings. The spending shifts from passive cash payments to active support that actually gets people back to work.
Why this is not punitive: the community contribution scheme at month 12 is sometimes described as "workfare." It is not. The person is being paid, contributing something real and visible to their community, building recent employment history that makes them more attractive to employers, and maintaining the routine and structure that paid employment provides. The alternative, paying someone to do nothing for two years, damages their mental health, erodes their employability, and costs significantly more. The Danish evidence is clear: active labour market spending generates a 2 to 4 times return in reduced long-term benefit spend.
The Dutch model is separate and applies to people already in work
The Dutch model in Section G applies to people currently employed who go off sick, not to unemployed people. The distinction matters. The Dutch model makes employers financially responsible for the first 6 months of sick pay, incentivising them to invest in occupational health and early return-to-work support. It reduces the flow of employed people onto long-term benefits. The Danish model gets unemployed people back to work. Together they address both routes into long-term welfare dependency: losing a job and drifting there, and staying in work until sickness tips you into it.
D. The Reciprocity Requirement: Attendance, Not Paperwork
A welfare system keeps public support when people believe it is reciprocal: that those who can contribute something do. Most working people who fund the system believe this, and they are right to. Forge builds reciprocity into long-term claiming, but it does so in a way that actually works, by learning from why previous attempts failed.
Why job-search requirements do not work
Every UK government has required benefit claimants to "actively seek work," usually measured by counting job applications. This is trivially easy to game and everyone knows it. You apply for jobs you have no chance of getting. If called to interview, you underperform deliberately. You tick the box and keep the benefit. The system cannot tell the difference between a person sabotaging an interview and a person who is simply nervous or unlucky, because intent cannot be proven. The DWP has known this for years. Its own evaluations of the Mandatory Work Activity scheme and the Community Action Programme found little or no employment benefit, precisely because effort-based conditions can be faked.
Forge does not count job applications as the qualifying activity for continued benefit. Searching for work is expected and supported, but it is never the test, because it cannot be verified and it can be gamed.
What cannot be faked is showing up
The qualifying activity for continued benefit after the initial period is verified attendance, measured by a register, at one of a defined set of activities. You can fake intent. You cannot fake presence. The requirement is not "try to get a job," it is "be at this place, doing this thing, for these hours," signed off by attendance.
- Approved training with a genuine attendance register and a recognised qualification at the end.
- A supported work placement with real hours and real tasks.
- A community contribution placement for those who cannot yet do the other two: environmental projects, social care support, council services, libraries, community facilities. Useful, visible work that maintains routine and builds recent employment history.
Real job search continues alongside any of these, with work coach support, but the benefit is paid against the attendance register, not against an application count. A person working cash-in-hand while claiming cannot be at a placement three days a week during working hours. They must choose: give up the undeclared work, or give up the claim. This is the mechanism that actually deters fraud, and it is the largest single source of saving from the reform.
The honest fiscal position
Forge is honest about what this saves and how. The saving does not come from the unpaid labour itself, and it does not come from large numbers of people walking straight into jobs. Supervised placements cost money to run: organising, supervising, attendance management. Historically £3,000 to £5,000 per participant per year. The genuine saving comes from three secondary effects: the attachment effect, where people doing undeclared work disengage from the claim rather than attend (the DWP found this effect is often larger than the employment effect); the routine and recent-work-history effect, which moves some people back toward employment over time; and the strengthening of public consent for the welfare system as a whole. After running costs, the conservative net saving is approximately £1 to 2 billion per year. This is a real but modest number, and Forge presents it as such rather than inflating it. The reciprocity requirement is justified first by fairness and work-readiness, and second by a modest net saving, in that order.
The exemptions that make it humane
- People with severe disabilities assessed for Stream 3 direct provision are fully exempt. The reciprocity requirement applies to people capable of activity, not to those who genuinely cannot.
- People with significant caring responsibilities (caring for a disabled child, a disabled adult, or an elderly relative) are exempt. Their caring is their contribution.
- Parents of young children have requirements adjusted around childcare and school hours, never imposed in a way that conflicts with caring for a young child.
- People in genuine ill-health episodes, including mental health crises, have requirements paused with clinical sign-off, not enforced through them.
The placements must be genuinely useful, must not displace paid jobs, and must have a clear route toward real employment. This is the Danish model with a sharper reciprocity element, paired with genuine support. It is not the discredited workfare model of unpaid labour with nothing wrapped around it, which the UK already tried and which its own evaluations found did not work.
D. Citizen Digital ID: Real-Time Verification
The single most significant anti-fraud reform in this manifesto is not a new inspector or a new form. It is a Citizen Digital ID linked to real-time data from HMRC, the Home Office, and the NHS. Benefits are calculated from verified facts, not self-reported claims. The current system asks claimants to declare their income, their household composition, and their residency. Then it checks, slowly and incompletely. Forge inverts this: the system knows, from verified sources, and pays accordingly.
Why it launches as voluntary but becomes mandatory: The Digital ID cannot be made compulsory on day one because the government database connections (X-Road — see Section XVII) take 12 to 18 months to build. Mandating an ID card before the system can actually use it creates resentment without the benefit. So it launches as voluntary, incentivised by genuinely useful services — faster benefit processing, pre-filled tax returns, unified NHS login. Take-up is expected to be high because it makes life easier for the honest majority.
Compulsion matters for one specific reason: if voluntary take-up leaves a 20 to 30% opt-out, those opt-outs are disproportionately the fraud cases. The honest person signs up because it helps them. The fraudster avoids it because it exposes them. Without eventual compulsion for benefits specifically, the verification system has a deliberate structural hole in it. By Year 2 to 3, once the system is proven and the majority already have one, Digital ID becomes mandatory for accessing welfare benefits. At that point the remaining opt-outs face in-person verification, which is slower and more burdensome than digital ID — a further incentive to register.
What the Digital ID verifies automatically
- Employment and earnings. HMRC PAYE records update in real time. A claimant who starts a job and does not declare it is detected within the first pay cycle, not at annual review. The benefit adjusts automatically. The claimant is not left to accidentally accrue an overpayment they then cannot repay.
- Household income and composition. Child Benefit is currently paid per child regardless of household income above the clawback threshold, with that clawback administered through self-assessment. This creates a system where high-earning households claim Child Benefit and then repay it through their tax return, wasting administrative effort on both sides. Under the Citizen Digital ID system, Child Benefit is adjusted automatically based on real-time household income verified from HMRC records. No form, no clawback, no overpayment. Households with combined income below the threshold receive full Child Benefit. Above it, the payment tapers and stops. Automatically.
- Bank account verification. With explicit claimant consent at application, account balance data confirms that savings thresholds are not being exceeded. Claimants do not need to self-report savings figures that the system can verify directly. Fraud through concealed savings is eliminated.
- Overseas residency. Passport control and border data flags absences exceeding 4 weeks. Benefits requiring UK residency are suspended automatically. The claimant is notified and can appeal where there is a genuine reason. The current situation where people claim UK benefits while living abroad for extended periods is detectable and stopped.
- Undeclared relationships. Council Tax records, address data, and electoral roll information cross-referenced through X-Road identifies cases where a partner is undeclared. Single-person benefit claims are verified against household data rather than self-declaration alone.
- Immigration status. Right-to-reside verified at application and automatically rechecked. A visa expiry or change in status triggers immediate benefit review. No-recourse-to-public-funds conditions enforced systemically rather than relying on claimant self-reporting a change that is financially disadvantageous to them.
The privacy architecture matters. This is not a surveillance database. The Citizen Digital ID uses the Estonian X-Road model: each agency holds its own data; the ID enables a secure, audited query between them with explicit claimant consent recorded at application. Every query is logged. Claimants can see which agencies have queried their data and when. The system knows what it needs to know to administer benefits correctly. It does not hold a centralised record of all activity. The consent is specific: "I agree that HMRC and DWP may share my income data to calculate my benefit entitlement." Not a blank surveillance authorisation.
E. Benefit Fraud Reporting: The Civic Reward Scheme
The UK loses approximately 9.5 billion pounds per year to benefit fraud and error. Much of it is known about locally before it reaches a DWP investigator. Employers know someone is working cash-in-hand while claiming. Landlords know there is an undeclared occupant. Teachers know a SEND voucher is being used for the wrong child. Schools know someone has not been in the country for months.
The current reporting mechanism is a phone line offering nothing in return. Reporting rates are low, prosecutions are rare, and the visible impunity of fraud in plain sight undermines public confidence in the system.
An honest limitation: The Civic Reward Scheme works well for fraud that is demonstrable from records — undeclared employment (visible via HMRC), overseas residence (visible via border data), wrong-child voucher use (visible to the school). It is less effective for cohabitation fraud where someone gives a false address, because proving someone actually lives somewhere requires investigation rather than data-matching. The Digital ID cross-referencing of council tax records and electoral roll makes cohabitation fraud harder to sustain over time as more data points appear at the real address. But it is not a complete solution. We say this honestly.
Forge introduces the Civic Reward Scheme: a structured financial incentive for verified benefit fraud reports, modelled on the US Internal Revenue Service whistleblower programme and the UK's successful Crimestoppers reward structure.
How it works
- Report via a dedicated secure online portal (not a phone line: digital, anonymous at submission, audited).
- Reports are triaged by a specialist DWP Fraud Intelligence Unit within 14 days.
- If the report leads to a confirmed fraud finding, the reporter receives the equivalent of 3 months of the fraudulently claimed benefit as a civic reward. On an average fraudulent Jobseeker Support claim, that is approximately £1,500 to £2,500.
- The reporter chooses where the reward goes:
- Direct payment to themselves (bank transfer)
- Donation to an approved charity from a published list (including foodbanks, veterans organisations, mental health charities, hospices, and NHS trusts)
- Donation to a local community cause or Forge Club project
- For large-scale organised fraud rings (coaching false claims, multiple identities, carer fraud networks), the reward is scaled to the total fraud recovered over 12 months, capped at £25,000 per report.
- False or malicious reports face no penalty for the first report if made in good faith. Repeat malicious reporters face a fine equivalent to the investigation cost.
F. PIP: Services Not Cash, Targeted to Actual Need
Personal Independence Payment was designed to cover the extra costs disabled people face: heating, equipment, transport, personal care. The principle is correct. Disability is genuinely expensive. Disability charity Scope calculates that disabled households face average additional costs of around £1,095 per month. These costs are real.
But the current implementation has a fundamental design problem. PIP is delivered as cash, paid into a bank account every four weeks, with no requirement that it reaches what it was meant for. A flat rate is paid regardless of whether your actual disability costs are £200 a month or £1,500 a month. Universal Credit replaces lost income. PIP was supposed to cover the extra cost of being disabled. Cash with no verification cannot reliably do that.
Forge restructures PIP around a clear principle: PIP is for long-term physical disability, and it is delivered as services and targeted support rather than cash. Mental health is a health condition and belongs with the NHS, not the disability benefit system. So mental health is removed from PIP entirely and addressed through a major expansion of NHS mental health services accessible directly through the NHS App. This is not a cut to mental health support. It is moving mental health from a cash payment that does nothing to treat the condition, to actual treatment that does. The money saved funds both the NHS mental health expansion and the defence rebuilding the country urgently needs.
The political point: this reform is not an attack on disabled people or people with mental health conditions. It is the opposite. PIP becomes what it was always meant to be: support for the extra costs of long-term physical disability, delivered as the services and equipment people actually need. Mental health conditions are treated where they should be treated, by the NHS, with fast access to talking therapies through the NHS App rather than a cash payment that does nothing to address the underlying condition. Someone with depression does not need a monthly cheque that they lose if they recover. They need treatment, quickly. Forge delivers that. The money no longer spent on cash payments that fail to treat anyone funds both the NHS mental health expansion and the defence of the country.
The Three Streams (Plus NHS Mental Health Pathway)
- Stream 1 — Employer-funded support, no cash. For disabled people capable of work with the right support (~40% of remaining PIP claimants). PIP cash replaced entirely by the Employer Accommodation Fund, an NIC rebate, employer support payments of up to £4,000 in Year 1 and £2,000 in Year 2, and a no-risk sick pay guarantee. The disabled person gets a job. The employer gets generous support that makes the hire attractive.
- Stream 2 — Personal Employment Budget, time-limited. For those building toward work where one specific barrier can be identified (~25%). £3,800 cap, two-year maximum, then reassessment. Not a permanent category.
- Stream 3 — Direct provision for severe disability. For those who genuinely cannot work due to severe and permanent physical conditions (~35%). No cash. Care hours, equipment, and adaptations provided directly. Social worker assessment every 18 months. Universal Credit and Housing Benefit cover income.
- Mental health is not PIP. Mental health conditions are removed from PIP entirely and addressed by the NHS through a major expansion of mental health services accessible directly through the NHS App: self-referral to talking therapies, digital CBT, and counselling, with no GP gatekeeping and fast access. People with physical disabilities who also have a mental health condition are assessed for Streams 1 to 3 on their physical disability and receive the NHS mental health service alongside, like any other citizen.
G. Mental Health: Treated by the NHS, Not Paid by PIP
This is one of the most important reforms in the welfare programme, and the one most likely to be misrepresented, so the principle must be stated plainly. Approximately 1.37 million PIP claimants (37% of the total) have a mental health condition as their primary basis for the claim. Under the current system they receive cash, on average £6,200 per year, paid into a bank account with no requirement that anything is done with it, no treatment, and no expectation of recovery. The payment often continues indefinitely.
This is not support. It is abandonment with a cheque attached. A person with depression or anxiety receives money that does nothing to treat their condition, while waiting up to 18 months for NHS talking therapies. Worse, the cash creates a financial trap: if they recover, they lose the payment, so the system gives them a reason to stay unwell. No humane system should be designed this way.
What Forge does instead
Mental health is removed from PIP entirely. It is a health condition and it is treated by the NHS, where health conditions belong. The money currently spent on cash payments funds a major expansion of NHS mental health services accessible directly through the NHS App:
- Self-referral through the NHS App with no GP gatekeeping. A person who needs mental health support requests it directly in the app and is triaged within days, not months.
- Talking therapies within weeks, not 18 months. CBT, counselling, and structured psychological treatment. The expansion funds enough therapist capacity to bring waiting times down dramatically.
- Digital CBT and guided self-help available immediately through the app for mild to moderate conditions, with human therapist escalation when needed.
- Continuous care, not a one-off. A treatment plan with a clinician, reviewed and adjusted, aimed at genuine recovery and at equipping people with the tools to manage their condition and return to a full life.
- Income during treatment is covered by Universal Credit exactly as for any other person who cannot currently work, with no separate disability cash payment for the mental health condition itself.
Severe and enduring mental illness
People with severe, enduring psychiatric conditions, including psychosis, schizophrenia, severe bipolar disorder, and severe treatment-resistant conditions certified by a consultant psychiatrist, are treated as having a long-term disability and are assessed for Stream 3 direct provision. They receive full ongoing support and care. The removal of mental health from PIP applies to the large majority of claims, which are for anxiety and depression, not to the small number of severe psychiatric disabilities that genuinely meet the threshold for long-term disability support.
Why this is better for the person, not just the budget
A person with moderate depression currently receives roughly £6,200 a year in PIP cash and waits up to 18 months for treatment. Under Forge they receive treatment within weeks through the NHS App, with income covered by Universal Credit while they cannot work, and a clinical team committed to their recovery. The cash they currently receive treats nothing. The service they receive under Forge treats the actual condition. This is a better deal for the person with the mental health condition, not a worse one.
The fiscal effect
Removing mental health from PIP saves approximately £8.5 billion per year in cash payments. The NHS App mental health expansion costs approximately £1.5 billion per year. On a conservative basis, accounting for the minority of claimants who have physical conditions alongside their mental health condition and are assessed for Streams 1 to 3, the net saving is approximately £5.3 billion per year. This money is directed to the defence rebuilding the country urgently needs: the drone industrial base, the integrated AI battle management system, and the conventional forces that three years of war in Europe have shown to be essential. A nation that cannot defend itself cannot protect anyone, including its most vulnerable.
The defining principle: PIP is for long-term physical disability. Mental health is a health condition treated by the NHS. The current system confuses the two and serves people with mental health conditions badly by paying them to stay unwell rather than treating them. Forge separates them cleanly. The NHS treats mental health, quickly and through the app. PIP supports physical disability through services and equipment. The money that was achieving nothing as cash funds treatment that works and the defence the country needs.
Stream 1: Employer-Funded Support, No Cash Payment
For disabled people assessed as capable of work with the right support (the largest single group, approximately 25% of current PIP claimants), the PIP cash payment is replaced entirely by employer-funded support delivered through the Employer Accommodation Fund. The disabled person receives no cash from PIP. They receive paid employment with all the additional costs of their disability covered by the Fund and substantial financial incentives for the employer that make them genuinely attractive to hire.
What the disabled person receives
- A job, supported by an employer who has been given every incentive to hire and retain them.
- Workplace adaptations and equipment procured directly by the Fund and delivered to the workplace, free to the disabled person and free to the employer.
- Occupational health assessment paid by the Fund, identifying exactly what is needed for them to work effectively.
- A supported employment worker placed alongside them for the first three months at no cost to anyone but the Fund.
- Universal Credit covering income during the transition into work if needed, exactly as for any non-disabled UC claimant.
What the employer receives
- Free workplace adaptations and equipment with no upfront cost and no claim-back process. The Fund pays suppliers directly. The employer never sees an invoice for disability-related costs.
- NIC rebate at 12 months equivalent to 6 months of employer National Insurance contributions for that employee, automatically credited to the PAYE account. For a median-salary employee, approximately £1,200. For a small employer, that is genuinely meaningful.
- Generous employer support payments for 1 to 2 years. For employers hiring people whose disability significantly limits their immediate productivity, a direct payment to the employer for the first or second year on a sliding scale that recognises the real cost of supporting a disabled employee into full productivity. Year 1: up to £4,000 per employee. Year 2: up to £2,000. This is genuinely transformative for the small employer who might otherwise consider the hire too risky.
- No-risk sick pay guarantee for two years. The Fund covers all disability-related sick pay. The employer pays nothing if the employee is off work due to their disability. Modelled on the Dutch Wet Banenafspraak that moved the Netherlands from 45% to 63% disabled employment over eight years.
- Reassessment without escalating cost. If the employee's condition changes, the Fund reassesses and adjusts equipment and support. The employer is never left holding an escalating cost.
The principle
The disabled person's PIP cash payment of £4,000 to £6,000 per year, which is paid into their bank account regardless of whether they work, is replaced by approximately £4,000 to £6,000 per year channelled through the employer in the form of payments, NIC rebates, and risk guarantees. The disabled person receives the same value, but they receive it as a job rather than as a benefit. The fiscal cost is broadly similar. The economic and social outcome is transformatively different. A person in skilled work, earning a salary, paying tax, contributing to a pension, and building a career is a fundamentally different outcome from a person at home receiving cash to compensate for the absence of work.
This stream is the single largest fiscal restructuring in the welfare programme. Approximately 930,000 current PIP claimants whose primary issue is a mild to moderate physical disability that prevents work without support are moved off PIP cash and into supported employment under this framework. Estimated saving from this stream alone: £2.5 to 3.5 billion annually once fully transitioned, with the disabled person better off because they have a job and earnings rather than a cash payment.
Stream 2: The Personal Employment Budget — tightly controlled
For those building toward work where one specific barrier is identifiable, the daily living component is replaced by a Personal Employment Budget. This stream is deliberately limited and transitional — it is not a softer form of PIP. Without strict controls it becomes exactly that.
- Capped at £3,800 per year — equivalent to the current average daily living component. Not a blank cheque.
- Pre-approved against a written employment plan produced with an employment adviser or social worker. Every spend must map to a specific identified barrier in that plan. "Driving lessons" is approvable if transport is the documented barrier. It is not approvable as a general-purpose allowance.
- Receipted and released in tranches. The budget is not paid as a lump sum. Each spend is receipted and verified before the next tranche releases. Unspent funds return to the assessment pool, not to the claimant.
- Time-limited to 2 years maximum. Stream 2 is a transitional state. At 12 months, a formal review assesses progress toward employment. At 24 months, a full reassessment determines the correct stream: Stream 1 if the person is ready for employer-supported work, Stream 3 if the barrier has proved insurmountable. Stream 2 does not roll over indefinitely.
- The mobility component continues as funded transport throughout — dial-a-ride, accessible taxi, adapted vehicle grants. Not cash.
Stream 3: Direct provision for those who genuinely cannot work
For people with permanent, severe conditions where employment is genuinely impossible — certified by a specialist clinical panel, not a form — PIP is converted from cash to direct provision assessed by a qualified social worker.
- Social worker assessment every 18 months identifying actual disability-related costs: care hours, equipment, adaptations, specialist transport, heating, specialist food. Comprehensive and person-centred.
- All provision funded directly to providers. Care hours paid to the care agency. Equipment procured through approved suppliers. Adaptations commissioned directly. The money goes to what it is for.
- No cash element. Universal Credit and Housing Benefit already cover income replacement. PIP in Stream 3 exists solely to fund the extra cost of disability. Direct provision ensures it does exactly that and nothing else.
- The 18-month review adjusts provision as needs change. A social worker who knows the person makes that judgement. Not a contractor on performance bonuses completing an annual form.
Why this is fairer, not harsher: Scope estimates disabled households face average extra costs of around £1,095 per month. The maximum PIP cash award is £10,119 per year — still thousands short of actual costs for severely disabled people. Direct provision assessed by a social worker funds what is actually needed. The genuinely severely disabled person gets better provision. The system stops funding things that are not disability costs.
G. The Dutch Model: Employer Responsibility First
In the Netherlands, employers are responsible for the first two years of sick pay and must fund a structured return-to-work programme before the state takes over. The result: Dutch employers actively invest in occupational health, early intervention, and workplace adjustment to avoid the cost. Their long-term sickness rates are significantly lower than the UK's.
- Employers pay the first 6 months of statutory sick pay plus fund an occupational health assessment and return-to-work plan. Employers who fail to engage face fines. Employers who succeed receive NIC rebates
- Fit notes from GPs limited to 4 weeks. Beyond 4 weeks, fit notes must be renewed by an occupational health physician. For absences beyond 3 months, objective medical evidence (scan, specialist letter, diagnostic test) is required
- Structured fit notes: what you CAN do, not just what you cannot. Following the Dutch model, fit notes specify residual capacity: "can work seated for 4 hours", "can work from home", "cannot lift over 5kg". Binary fit/unfit fit notes are abolished
- Occupational health at 4 weeks, not 4 months. Employers required to refer any employee on extended sick leave to occupational health within 4 weeks. State-funded for employers with fewer than 50 staff
- Graduated benefit for partial capacity. Someone who can work 2 days a week is not "unfit for work." They receive partial Jobseeker Support topped up to full rate while they work partially. The cliff-edge between full benefit and no benefit is replaced with a taper
I. Anti-Abuse Measures
- 30% face-to-face PIP assessment minimum (currently only 6%)
- Functional capacity evaluation for physical claims using objective tests, not self-reporting alone
- 3-year reassessment for recoverable conditions; permanent awards only with specialist certification
- Independent specialist clinical panels replace Atos and Capita contractors on performance bonuses
- Cross-verification with Citizen Digital ID detects undeclared paid work, overseas residency, and concealed household composition automatically
- Criminal prosecution for organised fraud networks coaching false claims. A dedicated DWP Fraud Intelligence Unit with 500 specialist investigators and prosecutorial resource
- Benefit repayment enforced through HMRC PAYE deduction at source for those who return to work. No more unenforceable overpayment letters
J. Investing in Domestic Social Care Workforce: Reducing Dependency on Immigration
The UK currently employs approximately 430,000 overseas workers in adult social care, representing roughly a third of the workforce. This reliance reflects a systemic failure to train, pay, and retain domestic workers rather than a genuine shortage of British people willing to do the work. Care work is demanding, skilled, and essential. It is also paid, on average, £11 to £12 per hour, often on zero-hours contracts, with minimal career progression and no professional recognition.
Forge addresses this directly through the same welfare reform framework:
- Care Work as a Retraining Destination. Anyone on Jobseeker Support for more than 3 months is offered funded retraining in adult social care as one of the primary tracks. The retraining is paid, structured, and leads to a recognised qualification (Level 2 or Level 3 Certificate in Health and Social Care) within 6 months. The state funds the training because the cost is recovered through reduced benefit spend and reduced reliance on expensive overseas recruitment.
- Career Structure and Pay. A formal career ladder for social care workers, with defined pay bands equivalent to NHS Bands 2 to 5, implemented across all public and publicly-funded care providers. Care workers at Band 3 or above receive the same terms, pension rights, and sick pay as NHS staff. This is funded through the welfare reform savings: money that currently pays Jobseeker Support to people who could be working in care is redirected to training those people and then paying them properly.
- Social Care Professionals Register. A mandatory register of qualified social care workers, equivalent to the Nursing and Midwifery Council register for nurses. Registration requires a recognised qualification and continuing professional development. This raises the status of the profession, improves quality, and creates a domestic workforce pipeline that reduces the pressure to recruit from overseas.
- The immigration consequence: these measures are designed to reduce the need for social care visas over a 5-year period as the domestic workforce grows. They do not eliminate overseas recruitment immediately: the current shortage is real and care homes cannot close while domestic workers are trained. The visa route for social care workers remains open during the transition but becomes subject to a national workforce plan reviewed annually, with the objective of reducing overseas dependency to under 15% of the workforce within 10 years.
K. Consolidate Small Payments Into Real Provision
The current system pays out dozens of small discretionary cash sums that are difficult to audit, easy to misdirect, and impossible to verify at scale. We replace untraceable cash with verified provision:
- Holiday and after-school activity money redirected into universal school provision (Section XIV). The money goes to the school. The provision is real and supervised
- Discretionary council crisis cash replaced by direct payment to providers. Energy bills paid directly to the supplier. White goods sourced through approved suppliers. Food through prepaid cards restricted to food retailers
- One Crisis and Transition Fund replaces the patchwork of local schemes. Single application through Universal Credit. Default is provision, not cash. Councils retain discretion for genuinely unique circumstances
- Healthy Start vouchers retained as they are already prepaid cards restricted to fruit, vegetables, and milk
L. State Pension: Double Lock Replaces Triple Lock
The pension triple lock guarantees the state pension rises by the highest of three measures: inflation, average earnings growth, or 2.5% per year. It was introduced in 2010 by the coalition government at a time when pensioner poverty was a genuine and serious problem. Pensioners in 2010 were disproportionately poor relative to working-age households. The triple lock was the right policy for that moment.
It is not the right policy for 2026. The triple lock has worked. Pensioner incomes have risen substantially relative to working-age incomes over 16 years of operation. The UK state pension, as a share of average earnings, is now higher than it has been in decades. In some age cohorts, average pensioner household income now exceeds average working-age household income when housing costs are accounted for. The poverty rate among pensioners has fallen significantly since 2010. The policy achieved its purpose.
The 2.5% minimum floor — the part that Forge removes — has no economic justification. It was a political commitment, not an economic one. It was designed to be a visible signal to pensioner voters that the state pension would always grow in real terms, regardless of economic conditions. When inflation is 2% and earnings growth is 1.5%, the floor triggers and costs approximately £2 to 3bn more than either the inflation or earnings measure would require. That additional money flows to pensioners as a group regardless of individual need, paid for by working-age taxpayers who are on average less wealthy than the pensioners receiving it.
The double lock: what it is and what it protects
The double lock retains the protection that actually matters. The state pension rises by whichever is higher: inflation or average earnings growth. This means:
- Pensioners are always protected against inflation eroding their living standards. If prices rise 5%, the pension rises at least 5%. The triple lock's core consumer protection is fully retained.
- Pensioners never fall behind workers. If earnings grow faster than inflation (as they do in a healthy economy), the pension tracks earnings. Pensioners share in economic prosperity.
- The 2.5% floor is removed because it provides an arbitrary minimum that bears no relationship to economic conditions, and because the cases where it triggers (when both inflation and earnings growth are below 2.5%) are precisely the cases where the broader economy is struggling and working-age taxpayers are least able to fund a floor that exceeds economic reality.
The people who need more support get it through a different route
A portion of the £5bn annual saving from the double lock is directed to a targeted pensioner poverty top-up for genuinely poor elderly people. This means more support for the 1.6 million pensioners in genuine poverty, funded by reducing the universal floor that benefits all 12 million pensioners regardless of their income or wealth. The poorest pensioner does better under the Forge model than under the triple lock.
The honest political argument
Every party in British politics knows the triple lock is fiscally unsustainable as the pensioner population grows. Every government since 2019 has found ways to temporarily suspend or avoid the floor when it became too expensive. Nobody will say publicly that it should be reformed because pensioners vote in large numbers and any change is immediately characterised as "attacking pensioners." Forge says it plainly: the 2.5% floor is no longer justified by the economic circumstances that created it, it is regressive relative to working-age people, and removing it while fully protecting pensioners against inflation and earnings falls is the honest and fair thing to do.
Estimated annual saving: £5 billion by Year 3, growing. The saving varies annually depending on whether the floor would have triggered. The OBR models it at approximately £5bn on average across the parliament. Part of this saving funds the targeted pensioner poverty top-up. The rest goes to deficit reduction.
M. Means-Testing Universal Pensioner Benefits via HMRC
Five universal benefits are currently paid to all pensioners regardless of income or wealth: the Winter Fuel Payment, free TV licence (over-75s), free bus pass, free NHS prescriptions (from age 60), and Attendance Allowance. Together they cost approximately £10.5bn annually. The majority flows to pensioners who do not need them — people with final salary pensions, investment income, and property wealth who are among the wealthiest households in the country.
The political reason these benefits are universal is that means-testing them historically required a separate application, a separate assessment, and a separate bureaucracy. The administrative cost and the intrusion on pensioners was substantial enough that successive governments left them universal.
That argument ends when the HMRC real-time household income data becomes available through X-Road. Once household income is verified automatically at the tax year end, means-testing costs almost nothing to administer. The assessment is the HMRC data. There is no form. There is no interview. The benefit adjusts automatically based on the previous year's verified household income, exactly as Child Benefit already does through the High Income Child Benefit Charge.
What changes and what does not
| Benefit | Current position | Forge position | Threshold | Annual saving |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Winter Fuel Payment | Labour means-tested to pension credit recipients only (2024) | Extended to all pensioners below median household income. Withdrawn above. | £35,000 household income. Tapered to zero by £50,000. | £500m |
| Free TV Licence (over-75s) | BBC funds for pension credit recipients only | Free below £35,000 household income. 50% subsidy to £50,000. Full price above. | £35,000 to £50,000 taper | £350m |
| Free Bus Pass | Universal from state pension age | Universal to £50,000 household income. Withdrawn above. | £50,000 household income | £270m |
| Free NHS Prescriptions (60+) | Universal from age 60 | Free for household income below £35,000 and all on pension credit. Reduced £3 per item above £50,000 (vs £9.90 standard charge). | £35,000 to £50,000 taper | £400m |
| Attendance Allowance | Universal, cash, no means test | Already absorbed into Health and Disability Support Stream 3 (direct provision assessed by social worker). Not cash. | Provision assessed on need not income | £2bn (from direct provision conversion) |
| Total annual saving | £3.5bn | |||
Why the HMRC mechanism changes everything
Previous means-testing proposals for these benefits failed because the administrative cost was too high and the intrusion on pensioners was too great. Forge's position is different because:
- No application. Pensioners do not apply for means-testing or fill in any form. The HMRC system verifies their household income automatically at the tax year end using data already held.
- The same mechanism already exists. Child Benefit is currently means-tested through the High Income Child Benefit Charge — HMRC claws back Child Benefit from households above £60,000 through the self-assessment system. Forge applies exactly the same mechanism to pensioner benefits. The plumbing already exists.
- Annual adjustment. If a pensioner's income falls below the threshold in any year (through retirement, investment losses, or reduced pension), the benefit is automatically restored. The system tracks real income, not a one-time assessment that becomes outdated.
- Full protection for the poorest. Every pensioner on pension credit or with household income below £35,000 receives every benefit in full, exactly as now. The withdrawal affects only those above the median household income threshold.
The political argument
Universal pensioner benefits were justified when pensioners were disproportionately poor. That is no longer the case. Pensioner household incomes, after housing costs, are now on average higher than working-age household incomes in some age groups. A household with a final salary pension, investment income, and a paid-off house does not need a free bus pass or a Winter Fuel Payment. The working-age person on £28,000 funding those benefits does.
This is not an attack on pensioners. The 7 million pensioners on the lowest incomes retain every benefit in full. The 4 million pensioners with household incomes above the threshold pay for their own bus pass and TV licence. This is a reasonable ask of people who are, on average, among the wealthier households in the country.
Forge is also honest about the electoral consequence: pensioners are less likely to vote Forge regardless of this reform, and the working-age voters who benefit from the savings are more likely to. The political economy is correct as well as the policy.
What this is not: we are not stripping benefits from genuinely disabled people, cutting state pensions, or reintroducing cruel box-ticking assessments. We are spending less on cash transfers and more on treatment, retraining, and getting people back to productive lives. The measure of success is not the benefit bill falling. It is employment rising, ill-health reducing, and genuine claimants receiving better support than they currently get. Every pound saved on administration and fraud goes directly into the retraining guarantee and disability provision.
L. Projected Savings
Consolidating 30 benefits into 3, eliminating duplicate assessments, closing the 9.5 billion fraud and error gap through real-time verification, and reducing the DWP's 89,000-person department through automation generates substantial savings. Combined with Dutch-model employer responsibility and tightened mental health eligibility, the projected savings are 15 to 20 billion pounds per year by year 5. These are phased because the new system takes time to establish: year 1 saves around 2 billion, growing each year as the new processes bed in and fraud reduction compounds.